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Abstract
This article helps to demonstrate the complex relationships between three of the primary
actors involved in the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards. The
broad reaching effects of implementing a global set of accounting standards have yet to be
clearly identified and analyzed. In more closely examining the macroeconomic impact that is
likely to occur, it is essential to provide a framework in which to more easily view the
environment and thus establish reasonable conjectures that will be beneficial in identifying
various driving factors within these relationships. The existence of principal-agent
relationships between investors and companies has been thoroughly established in academic
publications. This paper examines a more complex multi-agent relationship that should be
considered and explored; looking beyond the established agency relationship of investors and
companies and expanding it to include the multi-faceted role fulfilled by government, more
clearly demonstrates the complications involved in fully adopting IFRS. From the perspective
of investors as principals, and both companies and governments acting as their agents, we
identify a complex knot of possibilities whose deconstruction is far beyond the scope of this
paper. It is essential to understand the basics behind this theory and embrace the existence of
this proposed relationship between investors, companies, and government which will be
assumed as my research progresses.
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Ⅰ Agency
The theory of agency was developed independently by both Stephen Ross and
Barry Mitnick in 1973. Ross is credited with originating the theory of agency in the
area of economics. He clearly identified the agency problem as being generic to
society. Ross’s approach focused on the problems innate within agency relationships
and identified significant existing problems and variables dealing with them as a
decision based incentive problem, ignoring the components that wholly constituted
the agency relationship. Mitnick concurrently developed the institutional theory of
agency. His approach, while overlapping in areas, focused primarily on the
relationships within institutions, specifically focusing upon the relationship between
managers and employees. Their works are essentially parallels and both avenues of
research stem from basic imperfections found in agency relationships 1. To fully
understand the theory of agency it is important to consider both economic and
institutional theories.
The theory of agency is a supposition that explains the relationship between
principals and agents in business. Agency theory is primarily concerned with
resolving problems that exist in agency relationships; that is, between principals
(such as shareholders) and agents of the principals (for example, company
executives).
Agency theory addresses two concerns: “the problems that arise when the desires
or goals of the principal and agent are in conflict and the principal is unable to
verify the agent’s actions.’ and ‘the variance in risk tolerance which may lead the
principal and agent to take different actions 2.”
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The theory of agency derives its basis from the law of agency which is defined as a
consensual relationship created by contract or by law where one party, the principal,
grants authority for another party, the agent, to act on behalf of and under the
control of the principal to deal with a third party. An agency relationship is fiduciary
in nature and the actions and words of an agent exchanged with a third party bind
the principal 3.
But perhaps we might more specifically define agency as a situation wherein an
agent acts on behalf of a principal within the scope of his authority which has been
granted to him expressly or can be implied from the circumstances. The Agent’s
actions bind the principal and the third party unless it follows from the
circumstances of the case that the agent undertakes to bind himself only 4.
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Figure 1: Standard Principle-Agent Problem
3 DeMott, 2003, p. 291.
4 Roshni and Vimal, 2013, p. 51.
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The theory of agency is plagued by the problem of information asymmetry; a
situation in which one party in a transaction has more or superior information than
another. This causes potentially harmful situations because one party can possibly
take advantage of the other party’s lack of knowledge 5.
Management and investors are constantly in need of vast amounts of high quality
data thus enabling them to make well informed decisions that minimize risk and
maximize return. Time and cost constraints often make perfect information
impossible and the pursuit of it unrealistic. Information asymmetry is inevitable.
Even if two parties are granted access to the same information, there is generally
private information which will not be shared.
Even if both parties were to receive the private information, the interpretation and
extraction of useful details from the information would be unlikely to yield
equivalent results, ultimately leading to agency costs.
Ⅱ Agency or Stewardship
For the purposes of this paper, explanation is limited to the examination of
information asymmetry between companies, financial markets, and government,
focusing on information asymmetry and assuming ‘There is goal conflict between the
principal and the agent.’ “Agents have more information than principals, which can
be exploited for self-gain 6”.
At this point, it is important to mention another viable theory as well. A case for
the application of stewardship theory could be argued as an alternative to a
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standard principal-agency approach. Stewardship theory holds that managers, left
on their own, will indeed act as responsible stewards of the assets they control. In
American politics, an example of the stewardship theory might be a president
governing based on their belief that their duty is to do whatever is necessary in
national interest, as opposed to one group or body 7. Though it could be argued that
bureaucracy is better approached by way of stewardship theory, an evolved principal-
agent relationship often develops, which mirrors some of the practices put forth
under stewardship theory 8.
Both agency theory and stewardship theory deal largely with trust and a belief,
one way or another, as to whether agents work for the benefit of the principal or
whether they require more specific motivation.
Agency theory, in its assumption that agents’ self-interest will interfere with a
principal’s agenda, deals largely with incentive programs for aligning interests.
Stewardship is more often than not applicable in instances where financial
remunerations are not possible and the currency of incentive is instead, replaced by
the status of reputation. This is most readily seen in the relationship between
politicians and constituents.
Failure to adhere to the agenda of constituents can lead to significant and
immediate consequences, perhaps chief among them being the destruction of
reputation which acts as a sanction. This same incentive “scheme” can be applied in
instances of evolved agency relationships. Agents achieve reward in the form of
enhanced reputation and sanction in the form of damaged credibility. In instances
such as bureaucratic oversight, where market share may be devoid of competition,
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diminished reputation may have no adverse effect on a provider’s opportunity for
continued contracting in the way that agency theory suggests that it should 9.
Ⅲ Establishing the Principal-Agent Relationship
In a traditional principal-agent relationship, such as that observable between
shareholders, i.e. investors, and the management of listed companies, shareholders
act as the principal and invest in a company expecting an acceptable return on their
investment in the form of dividends or similar remuneration. In contrast, managers
are interested in maximizing their own gains which are most often achieved by
maximizing the profit of the company. The contrasting interests are usually
overcome by means of incentive plans. Examples include; the granting of stock, stock
options, and bonuses to promote practices that align managers interests with that of
the investors 10.
It can be argued that a similar situation exists between investors and government
or bureaucrats. Investors desire to maintain all of the benefits and protections of
government. Taxes are levied against them in order to fund these efforts. The
investors, i.e. constituents, expect government and their elected bureaucrats to work
in their best interest. Individuals or groups prefer optimizing their own gains to
sacrificing for the benefit of another individual or collective. Therefore agents will
often pursue actions that benefit them, regardless of the consequences inherent to
the principals 11.
Although governments, or bureaucrats, act in the role of agents, history has
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repeatedly demonstrated that in the political arena, self-interest tends to prevail
over principal interest. Additionally with so many elected bodies being pressured
from various angles, it is difficult to ensure that a principal’s needs are met at all.
Furthermore, the extent to which government works in the interest of principals
often extends only as far as will secure the continued patronage of the principal
while ensuring government interests are protected.
It is here that we are forced to diverge from a standard principle-agent problem
and advance to a multi-agent problem. Often you see government or companies
mentioned as the principal in an agency problem. In contrast this multi-agent
problem displays both as agents of investors. It clearly demonstrates where agency’s
primary problems, information asymmetry, agency cost, and conflicting interests;
assert their presence in the equation.
Ⅳ Multiple-Agency
Agency relationships often have significant information asymmetry. Such
relationships are at their most asymmetric point when basic agency theory breaks
down. Preferences are unknown or go unsatisfied, contracts are not formulated,
incentives are not fashioned, monitoring goes un-mobilized, and sanctions are not
levied 12. In regards to a regulating body, investors are often left with the SEC or
other similar agencies, to ensure their protection and uphold their expectations.
However, the investors do have some control of the legislators that govern the SEC
and can thereby influence matters in that way. As far as the selection of their other
agent in this scenario, investors always have their choice of which company to
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entrust their investment to. Ultimately a successful principal-agent relationship
should decrease uncertainty and Agency Cost and adhere to the interests of the
principal.
The difficulty that arises in a multiple-agent problem, especially in this example,
is that agents often have competing interests. Companies are not necessarily eager,
but are often willing to undertake actions, such as the adoption of IFRS. The
potential increase in foreign investment is a significant incentive for them to do so.
Companies do face the risk of increased taxation in the future; however the benefits
can potentially outweigh the drawbacks of open disclosure.
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Figure 2: Multi-agent model.
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Ⅴ Agency Costs
We can at this point, readily identify a clear example of the potential costs
involved. The adoption of IFRS would require governments to give up considerable
control of their sovereign taxation rights, potentially reducing their income tax
receipts. This is a strong disincentive for the official adoption of IFRS over a country’s
established GAAP. All agency relationships are encumbered by agency costs. Agency
costs are defined as a type of internal cost that arises from, or must be paid to, an
agent acting on behalf of a principal. Agency costs arise because of core problems
such as conflicts of interest between shareholders and management.
Shareholders wish for management to run the company in a way that increases
shareholder value. But management may wish to grow the company in ways that
increase their personal power and wealth and are not necessarily in the best
interests of shareholders 13. It is important to realize that there will always be
divergence between an agent’s decisions and those decisions which might benefit the
welfare of the principal. This residual loss should always be expected and cannot be
completely eliminated outside of a theoretical perfect principal-agent relationship.
Various agency costs exist, however, for the purpose of this article we will limit
our mention to adverse selection and moral hazard, both of which deal with market
failure. Adverse Selection may be defined as: A phenomenon wherein the one party
is confronted with the probability of loss due to unknown risk which were not
factored in at the time of sale 14. Moral Hazard may be defined as: The risk that a
party to a transaction has not entered into the contract in good faith, has provided
69
13 Meckling et al., 1976, p. 316.
14 Jagannathan et al., 2011, p. 69.
Studies in Business and Accounting Vol. 8
misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity, or has an
incentive to take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit before the
contract settles 15.
For our purposes we can say that adverse selection occurs when a party, most
commonly the agent, has better information than the other party, generally the
principal, prior to the establishment of an agency relationship.
This allows the party with the better information, in this case the agent, to act
opportunistically prior to the establishment of any binding obligation. In an instance
of moral hazard the party would act opportunistically after the establishment of a
binding obligation.
A simple example which demonstrates adverse selection would be investors
receiving information procured by the SEC. Such information would have been
procured through independent audit demonstrating that a firm was adhering to
GAAP and disclosing accurate details related to sales, assets, and earnings. Bad
firms sometimes slant their information to improve the outlook to investors which in
turn causes adverse selection for investors. That money could have been invested in
a better firm if the investors possessed more accurate information.
An example of moral hazard on the other hand, can be shown in the form of a firm
selling stock under the guise of investing in valuable assets but instead using those
funds to pay off retirement debt. Without strong safeguards in place for both parties
to enforce obligations, there is the strong possibility for deceit and misappropriation.
Figure 2 demonstrates the complexity of introducing a second agent to a
relationship. The areas in-between principals and agents are where asymmetric
information lies. The lower half of the figure demonstrates overlapping or competing
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interests between agents. Some examples of asymmetric information utilized in a
multi-agent problem might be controversial legislation, or the leaking of information
between agent and principal in regards to other agents 16.
Ⅵ Aligning Interests and Agent Remuneration
Where government involvement is concerned we are forced to consider the impact
of International Financial Reporting Standards on tax revenues. Beyond tax
revenue, governments do not have profits or monetary gains to distribute among
public agencies or politicians for adhering to the interests of a principal. There are
many metaphors which clearly demonstrate this fact. Politicians seek to obtain
votes, bureaucrats need big budgets.
Policy commitments often undermine the expectation of goal conflict resolution
between principals and agents 17. When dealing with political entities, remunerations
are usually conferred in the form of reputation or sanction. Proof of the government
interest in lost revenue can easily be seen in the current case being made against
Caterpillar Inc. The US government is alleging that Caterpillar has deferred or
avoided billions of dollars in tax liability over the past decade. This was
accomplished by shifting profits from overseas replacement-part sales to a Swiss
subsidiary 18.
Additionally the US government is currently scrutinizing Swiss banks
participating in the U.S. Justice Department program and others outside of the
program which have allegedly been hosting undeclared U.S. assets to help
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circumvent tax payments 19. Subsequently of interest is the fact that Switzerland
began IFRS convergence in 2002 and full adoption in 2005, which includes IAS tax
regulations for listed companies 20.
Ⅶ Conflicting Interests: Simple Scenario
Recalling from our earlier mention that agents working for a principal often have
varying or competing interests allows us to look more closely at Figure 2 and
acknowledge the potential for agency problems. The overlapping region at the
bottom of Figure 2 representing mutual interests between government and
companies, the two primary agents mentioned in this article. These interests rarely
align in a convenient manner. It is in the resolution of these competing interests
that the strongest evidence of and most significant source of agency costs may be
found.
It is perhaps in the form of bureaucratic corruption that we can most clearly
define this issue. Bureaucratic corruption can be defined as bureaucratic behavior
that consciously deviates from the formal duties and accepted norms for private
advantage 21. These actions may be found among both politicians and managers,
however, for our purposes a simple example should suffice to see in what manner it
applies.
A simple yet effective scenario may be crafted in relation to the adoption of
International Financial Reporting Standards. Investors desire the use of
International Standards to ensure that they are investing their funds in, what they
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believe to be, the best option, thus potentially alleviating agency costs and promoting
a strong return on their investment.
IFRS can be described as essentially “investor focused”. The rationale underlying
this investor focus is that if the financial information produced satisfies the needs of
investors, it should also, by definition, meet most of the needs of other users of the
financial statements 22.
In the current environment, companies are often happy to comply because by
providing these statements they help promote foreign investment into the company,
thereby increasing capital. In instances where IFRS have been fully implemented
there are various examples of government passed legislation guaranteeing there will
be no increase in taxation. This is significant because some studies have revealed
that the use of IFRS for a tax base in Italy would increase the base tax rate by as
much as 20% 23. Regardless of whether IFRS increases the tax base it is still likely
that companies would adhere to investor interests to ensure access to investor
capital.
Governments on the other hand are rarely as responsive to the acceptance of
international standards due to beliefs that IFRS principles are too ‘investor focused’
to meet the requirements of taxpayers and tax authorities. It has been acknowledged
that IFRS might be an appropriate place to design a common tax base 24. The
adoption of IFRS would require governments to waive considerable control of their
sovereign taxation rights which is a considerable disincentive.
Research performed in Australia has demonstrated that the application of IFRS
in government reporting has shown a positive increase in both assets and
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liabilities 25.
It provides some evidence that suggests IFRS adoption would increase taxable
assets for companies as well and thereby potentially increases tax revenues for the
government. This same idea is reflected in the fore mentioned Italian study. If
proven true, it would provide strong incentive for governments to adopt IFRS for
various reasons. However, until it is proven, it is considered prudent to tote the
status quo.
Ⅷ Agency and Bureaucracy
The scenario mentioned above provides a simplistic view of one agent working
cohesively with the interests of the investor while the other does not. This scenario
can become much more complex when one takes into consideration the method in
which government legislation and politicians are influenced. It can be argued that
government and bureaucrats cannot be considered as agents because they are not
elected by any one individual and are not working for the interests of any select
person, generally speaking. Though true it is also an erroneous view.
Politicians are usually elected en masse by a collective of people to serve that
single collective’s various interests. Therefore it is vital to consider that though
investors are the majority in electing officials to represent them, companies are also
comprised of individuals with the same rights and privilege. Even companies
themselves are now empowered with the ability to elect officials to represent their
interests.
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Ⅸ Corporate Political Influence
Prior to 2010 the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibited labor unions and
corporations from spending money to influence federal elections and prohibited
unions from contributing to campaigns. However, the Citizens United V. Federal
Election Commission ruling, in 2010, brought to power a new political action
committee known as a Super PAC 26. These committees may not make contributions
directly to political campaigns or candidates however so long as they remain
independent they may engage in unlimited political spending, can raise funds from
individuals, corporations, unions, and other groups without any legal limit.
These Super PACs have continued to gain traction and receive large cash flows in
which to help support candidates of their choice. Companies are slowly becoming
strong contributors 27.
In the 2012 US primary elections Super PACs spent nearly 40 million supporting
Mitt Romney 28. Nearly 16 million was used to support Newt Gingrich 29. Companies
are able to use their inflows of investor capital to help fund their support of
candidates. This is an important consideration since the candidate selection may not
be in alignment with the investors own personal wishes and would not have been
considered an acceptable use of funds by the investors.
Additionally the development of the Super PACs gives significant power to foreign
companies who through localized subsidiaries are able to engage in the sovereign
political election process of a nation, which under other circumstances would be
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illegal.
Ⅹ Conclusion
Despite the various topics this article was forced to address, the existence of
complex multi-agent relationships, between government entities, companies, and
investors has been demonstrated. Though this relationship is not tangible and could
not easily be demonstrated through calculus, it suggests a viable relationship that
must be taken into consideration. Accounting standards are not solely based on the
laws of a country but on the society as well. The essential background information
provided the theories involved and clarified their application in real world examples
so that a plausible stance for assuming these agency relationships could be
established and defended, thereby enabling future research to continue unimpeded.
Though it must be acknowledged that the accounting systems in various countries
differ, it should be sufficient to say that if such relationships can be identified in
highly structured law and rule based societies such as the US, similar relationships
exist in other law bound nations, and most certainly exist is less restrictive
governments, thus permitting a base assumption that investors have an agency
relationship with both companies and government.
References
Akerlof, G. 1970. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3): 488-500.
Blake A., and Clizza. C. 2012. How super PACs are saving Mitt Romney. The Washington Post,
76
Agency and IFRS Implementation: The Relationship between Primary Participants
July 24.
DeMott, D. 2003. When is a Principal Charged with an Agent’s Knowledge? Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law, 13 : 291.
Caers, R., Du Bois, C., Jergers, M., De Gieter, S., Schepers, C., and Pepermans, R. 2012.
Principal-Agent Relationships On The Stewardship-agency Axis. Nonprofit Management
and Leadership, 17 : 25-47.
Easley, D., and Kleinberg, J. 2010. Chapter 7: Evolutionary Game Theory. In Netowrks,
Crowds, and Markets Reasoning about a Highly Connected World. Cambridge University
Press.
Gavana, G., Guggiola, G., and Marenzi, A. 2013. Evolving Connections Between Tax and
Financial Reporting in Italy. Accounting in Europe, 10 : 43-70.
Gillespie, J. 2001. Self-interest and ideology : bureaucratic corruption in Vietnam. Australian
journal of Asian law, 3 (1): 1-36.
Gold M., and Maso, M. 2012. Adelson donations to pro-Gingrich ‘super PAC’ total $16.5
million. Los Angeles Times, March 20.
Hagerty, J. R. 2014. The $2.4 Billion Tax Question for Caterpillar. The Wall Street Journal,
March 31.
Investopedia. 2014. Moral Hazard. Retrieved March 13, 2014 from
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moralhazard.asp
Jagannathan, M., Spizman, J., Schwartz, S., and Young, R. 2011. Accounting Finance and
Adverse Selection: Illustrations and Applications. Journal of Accounting Literature, 30 : 69-
101.
Kamran, A., and Manzural, A. 2012. The Effect of IFRS Adoption on the Financial Reports of
Local Government Entities. Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal, 6 (3):
109-120.
Kenneth, M. J., and Laurence, T. J. 2006. Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values:
Reframing the Debate. Public Administration Review, 66 (2): 177-192.
77
Studies in Business and Accounting Vol. 8
KPMG. 2005. IFRS compared to Swedish GAAP: An overview. KPMG.com.cn.
Larson, R. K., and Street, D. L. 2004. Convergence with IFRS in an expanding Europe:
progress and obstacles identified by large accounting firms’ survey. Journal of
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 13 : 91-92.
Marguiles, P. 2014. Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and The Separation of Powers. Boston University Legal Review, 94 : 105-177.
Meckling, W. H., and Jensen, M. C. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Owernership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4): 305-360.
Mitnik, B. M. 2013. Origin of the Theory of Agency: An Account By One of the Theory’s
Originators.
Morse, A., and Barrett, D. 2014. Switzerland, U.S. to Discuss Credit Suisse Tax Dodging. The
Wall Street Journal, May 2.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 2006, November. IFRS: Tax Implications for the EU financial
services industry - are you ready?. www.pwc.ch : 9.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 2008. IFRS 3 (Revised): Impact on Earnings - The Crucial Q&A for
Decision Makers. Price Waterhouse Coopers.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 2011, January 1. Similarities and Differences: IFRS for SMEs IFRS
SWISS GAAP FER 2010/11 Edition. www.pwc.ch : 78-82.
Shapiro, S. P. 2005. Agency Theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 31 : 263-284.
The Wall Street Journal. 2014. Retrieved April 5, 2014, from WSJ Projects:
http://projects.wsj.com/super-pacs/
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2009, March 24. Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission (Docket No.08-205). Retrieved February 15, 2014, from
Cornell University Law School: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/08-205.
Van Slyke, D. 2007. Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-
Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 17 (2): 157-187.
78
Agency and IFRS Implementation: The Relationship between Primary Participants
Zhang X., Bartol, K. M., Smith, K. G., Pfarrer, M. D., and Khanin, D. M. 2008. CEOs on the
edge: earnings manipulation and stock based incentive misalignment. Academy of
Management Journal, 51 (2): 243-258.
79
